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ONTOLOGICAL DISPROOF OF GOD'S EXISTENCE 
John N. Williams 
I. Hume's Principle 
In Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion 1 Hume says: 
Nothing is demonstrable unless the contrary implies a contradiction. 
Whatever we conceive of as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent. 
There is no being therefore whose non-existence implies a contradiction. 
Consequently, there is no being whose existence is demonstrable. 
An initial reading of  Hume's Principle is that no necessary truth can be denied 
without contradiction, whereas all existential propositions can. Therefore it is 
self-contradictory to say,that any existential claim is necessarily true, since it 
follows that this claim both can and cannot be denied without self-contradiction. 
Thus any claim of the form 'X necessarily exists' is a self-contradiction, even if X 
is God. 
The first half  of the principle is certainly true. All  bachelors are unmarried is 
a necessary truth because its denial is Some bachelors are married, which asserts 
that there is some bachelor or unmarried man who is married. The second half  of 
the principle is at least plausible, for we can consistently imagine as non-existent 
any thing which indisputably exists, e.g. Melbourne. 
II. Findlay's Ontological Disproof 
Findlay's Ontological Disproof  2 of God's existence uses Hume's Principle: 
The religious frame of mind . . . .  seems invincibly determined both to eat its 
cake and have it. It desires the Divine Existence both to have the 
inescapable character which can, on Kantian or modern views, only be 
found where truth reflects a connection of  characteris t ics . . ,  and also the 
character of 'making a real difference' which is only possible where truth 
doesn't have this merely hypothetical or linguistic basis ... It was indeed an 
ill-day for Anselm when he hit upon his proof. For on that day he not only 
laid bare something which is of the essence of an adequate religious object, 
but also something which entails its necessary non-existence. 
The 'inescapable c h a r a c t e r . . . '  is necessary truth. A bachelor is 'inescapably' 
unmarried given the 'linguistic basis' of the term 'bachelor'. The claim that 
I Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (ed.) N. Kemp Smith (London: Nelson, 1947) p. 
189. 
J.N. Findlay, 'Can God's Existence Be Disproved?', Mind 57 (1948) p. 182. 
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'making a real difference' is only possible where 'truth doesn't have this merely 
hypothetical or linguistic basis' is the claim that no statement about the world, 
for example an assertion that some entity exists, can be a necessary truth. This is 
a plausible claim if one looks at the obvious examples of necessary truths. The 
necessary truth Either it is raining or it is not tells us no fact about the world. It 
makes no 'real difference'. Here Findlay adopts Hume's Principle; he claims that 
no thing exists necessarily. But the claim that God exists is a necessary truth 'is of 
the essence of an adequate religious object'. Findlay thinks the necessity of God's 
existence is part of His definition, otherwise we would not be talking about a 
being worthy of worship. This too is at least plausible for it is odd to say 'God 
exists, but He may not exist tomorrow'. Believers might insist that trust or faith 
must be placed in something permanent. Here Findlay salvages what is left of 
Anselm's Modal Argument; not the misguided attempt to define God into 
existence, but rather the insight that i f  God exists, then He exists necessarily. But 
this is to 'have one's cake and eat it' for these two observations together ' en ta i l . . .  
[God's] . . . necessary non-existence'. 
Findlay's Disproof can be summarised as: 
P1) N o  thing exists necessarily. 
P2) If  G o d  exists then He  exists necessarily. 
C) .'. God necessarily does not exist. 
Ill. Is the Disproof Meaningful? 
The inclusion of the necessity operator in the conclusion has attracted criticism. 
Hartshorne a, for example, argues that if it makes sense to talk about God's 
necessary non-existence then it makes sense to talk about God's necessary 
existence. Thus if Findlay's conclusion makes sense then P1 cannot be 
supported by the claim that it is nonsense to say of any existential claim that it is 
necessarily true. Contrapositively, if it makes no sense to speak of God's 
necessary existence then it makes no sense to speak of  God's necessary non- 
existence. Thus if P1 is true because it is nonsense to assert necessarily true 
existential claims, then the conclusion is likewise nonsense. Now it looks as if it 
is Findlay's argument that is 'determined both to eat its cake and have it'. 
Hartshorne appeals to the general principle that if °X' makes sense then so 
does 'Not-X'*. This is certainly true. It makes sense to talk of 'counterfeit coins' 
only because it makes sense to talk of 'genuine coins', since to say that a coin is 
counterfeit is to say that it is not genuine. Contrapositively, one cannot 
transform nonsense into sense merely by prefixing it with a grammatical 
negation. 
Nonetheless, this criticism is doubly flawed. 
First, the general principle is irrelevant to Findlay's Disproof. P 1 is grounded 
by Hume's Principle, which does not assert that it is nonsense to make a 
necessary existential claim but rather that it is self-contradictory, since such a 
3 C. Hartshorne, Anselm's Discovery (Illinois: Open Court 1965) pp. 255-261. 
4 Cf. J.A. Passmore, Philosophical Reasoning (London: Duckworth, 1961) pp. 100-118. 
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claim is one which both can and cannot be consistently denied. Findlay's reason 
for saying that no thing has necessary existence is not that the notion of 
'necessary existence' is meaningless but rather that it is internally inconsistent. 
On this view it is coherent but self-contradictory to make any claim of the form °X 
necessarily exists'. 
Of course, this would be no objection given the intuition that all self- 
contradictions are meaningless. But this intuition is mistaken for two main 
reasons, s In fact all self-contradictions are meaningfu l  
First, if self-contradictions are meaningless then tautologies are not true. 
Hartshorne himself must appeal to the fact that to 'deny' a piece of nonsense is 
itself nonsense. But since tautologies are denials of  self-contradictions then if 
self-contradictions are nonsensical, so are tautologies. To deny the self- 
contradiction It is heavier and not  heavier than 10 kilos is to assert the tautology 
Either it is heavier than 10 kilos or it is not. And if tautologies are meaningless 
then they are not true. But this is absurd. Tautologies are the paradigm of 
truth. 
Second, and relatedly, we know that a statement like 'John is a married 
bachelor' is false, only because we know that it is a self-contradiction. But we 
know that it is a self-contradiction only because we know what it means. Unlike 
an explicit self-contradiction, a grasp of  its content, not its form, is needed. And if 
we know what it means then it has a meaning for us to know. On the other hand, 
we cannot make judgements about the truth-value of semantically nonsensical 
utterances like 'Mat the on is cat the'. 
There are two important sources of  blindness to the distinction. First, we 
might doubt that self-contradictory utterances like 'John is a married bachelor'  
have meanings on the grounds that they cannot be given. But counterintuitively, 
we can give the meaning of this apparently recalcitrant utterance, for it means 
that John is both married and unmarried and also both a bachelor and a non- 
bachelor. A possible objection to this is that this is no explanation, since it is 
neither informative nor different from the original utterance. But it is at least 
different in form from the original statement, because it, but not the original 
statement, has the form of a conjunction of explicit self-contradictions. And it 
follows that my explanation m a y  be informative. Suppose that someone seriously 
asserts the original statement because that person either does not know that it is a 
self-contradiction or because he or she does not know that being unmarried is an 
essential part of  bachelorhood. In this case my explanation may remedy both 
instances of ignorance. But even if my explanation/s uninformative, this is no 
objection. Although it is uninformative to say that 'Jack is taller than Jill' means 
that Jill is shorter that Jack, it is nonetheless true. Nor  will it do to insist that the 
explanation means nothing different from the original utterance, for then it 
follows that the original utterance has a meaning. Note also that the explanation 
is a logical consequence of  the original statement, and this shows that it is not 
nonsense, for we cannot draw logical consequences from genuine nonsense. 
N. Cooper, 'Inconsistency', Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1966) pp. 54-58, J.N. Williams, 
'Believing the Self-contradictory', American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (1982) pp. 
279-285. 
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A second source of the blindness is that we cannot imagine what it would be 
like for such statements to be true. Moreover, 'conceive' is ambiguous between 
'imagine' and 'have the concept of', so that the fact that it is unimaginable that 
John is a married bachelor tempts us to fallaciously assume that this is 
impossible to conceptualise, in which case 'John is a married bachelor' is 
conceptually empty or meaningless. But unimaginability does not entail 
unconceptualisability. 'Space is infinite' expresses something unimaginable, 
since any picture of space which I have in my mind's eye is always a picture of 
finite space. But we can explain what it is for space to be infinite by saying that 
for any two points A and B, there is some third point which is further from A 
than B is. And we always have the concept of what we explain. 
The second flaw in Hartshorne's criticism is that his general principle is 
misapplied to Findlay's argument. His principle was that to deny nonsense is 
nonsense. But the denial of 'X exists necessarily' is 'X does not exist necessarily', 
not 'X non-exists necessarily', yet Findlay's conclusion is of the latter form. 
In summary, no reason has been given for thinking the Disproof 
meaningless. 
IV. Is the Disproof Internally Consistent? 
This criticism of Hartshorne lays the ground for a stronger attack on Findlay's 
Disproof, namely that the conclusion is inconsistent with Hume's Principle. For 
the initial reading of Hume's Principle we have been using so far, is that it is a 
contradiction to say of any existential claim - -  whether a 'positive' claim that 
some thing does exist, or a 'negative' claim that some thing does not - -  that it is 
necessary. From this initial reading it follows that any claim of the form 'X exists 
necessarily' is a self-contradiction, which supports P1, but it also follows that any 
claim of the form 'X non-exists necessarily' is a contradiction too. If the Principle 
is true under this reading then Findlay's conclusion is not nonsense, but self- 
contradictory. 
There are only two ways to save the Disproof from this attack - -  by simply 
removing the troublesome necessity operator from the conclusion or by rejecting 
the initial reading of Hume's Principle. Although the first way is tempting, it is 
the second that should be taken. 
The first way is tempting because a nonmodal conclusion is all that seems 
validly derivable. So Findlay's new Disproof would be: 
P1) N o  thing exists necessarily. 
P2) If God exists then He exists necessarily. 
C ' )  .'. God does not exist. 
Little seems lost by this removal, since God's existence is disproved equally well. 
Moreover, it looks as if Findlay ought to stick with a nonmodal conclusion, since 
strengthening C" to C seems to require a claim that cannot be supported. C" 
entails that either God non-exists contingently or necessarily. So C could be 
derived by claiming that if God non-exists then He non-exists necessarily. But 
John N. Williams 208 
support for this claim cannot come from P2, s i n c e / f  God exists then there is a 
self-contradiction in supposing that He does not is formally consistent with God 
does not exist but there is no self-contradiction in supposing that He does. 
'Ordinary language' considerations might appear  to support it, given the oddity 
o f ' G o d  does not exist but He might tomorrow'. But even if pragmatic oddity were 
a guarantee of logical impossibility, this tensed remark is at best evidence that if 
God non-exists then He non-exists at all points in time, rather than evidence that 
if He non-exists then a denial of His existence is self-contradictory. 
But in fact Findlay cannot remove the necessity operator. This is not because 
it can be demonstrated that if God non-exists then His non-existence is logically 
necessary, but because consistency demands that he holds his premisses as 
necessary truths and because any conclusion that validly follows from necessary 
truths i's itself a necessary truth. 
To say that an argument is valid is to say that in any possible world in which 
the premisses are true, the conclusion is true. But if the premisses are necessarily 
true, i.e. true in all possible worlds, then the conclusion is true in all possible 
worlds. 
Findlay must hold his premisses as necessary truths. P1 is grounded by 
Hume's  Principle which says that any assertion of the form 'X exists necessarily' 
is a self-contradiction, since such an assertion says that the claim that X exists, 
both can and cannot be consistently denied. But if it is a self-contradiction to say 
of any thing that it exists necessarily, then it is a necessary truth that no thing 
exists necessarily. Thus if Hume's  Principle is true, P1 is necessarily true. 
Now consider P2, which asserts that if God exists t h e n H e  exists necessarily. If  
this is true, it cannot just  so happen that it is true, especially for Findlay who 
asserts it because he thinks that necessary existence is 'of  the essence [my 
emphasis] of an adequate religious object'. I f  the necessity of  God's  existence is 
part  of the definition of 'God',  then it is true by definition that if God exists then 
He exists necessarily. To be consistent, Findlay must claim that P2 is necessarily 
true. 
So Findlay must retain the necessity operator in his conclusion, which is 
rendered self-contradictory by Hume's  Principle under its initial reading. The 
correct defence of the Disproof at this point is to reject the initial reading of 
Hume's  Principle. Hume  certainly claims that all positive existential claims can 
be consistently denied, and this is at least plausible. But this does not claim that 
all negative existential claims can be consistently denied. 'Round squares don't 
exist' is true, and cannot be consistently denied, precisely because the concept of 
a round square is inconsistent. Indeed, on the initial reading the Principle is 
arguably self-refuting, since as already argued, it is necessary if true, and one way 
of expressing it is as 'There exist no necessary existential claims', which appears  
to be an existential claim. Thus when Hume's  Principle is given the more 
sensible reading that no positive existential claim is necessary, then Findlay's 
conclusion, which is a necessary negative existential claim, is consistent 
with it, 
In summary, no reason has been given for thinking the Disproof internally 
inconsistent. 
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V. Is the Disproof Sound? 
Is P2 true? Notice that throughout this discussion we have made the Humean 
assumption that 'necessity' means 'logical necessity'. But a kind of necessity 
which might more plausibly be part of God's essence is factual necessity. So 'God 
exists necessarily' does not mean 'D God exists', but rather that He is an entity 
which both exists at all points in time and is not dependent upon any other entity 
for His existence. 
One syntactic difference between logical and factual necessity is that 'God is 
factually necessary' cannot be parsed as 'It is factually necessary that God exists'. 
A logical difference is that to claim, for example, that certain sub-atomic particles 
require no cause for their permanence, is not to claim that their existence is 
logically necessary, since there is no inconsistency in supposing them non- 
existent. Likewise, factual necessity might be a defining characteristic of God, but 
this does not entail that His existence is logically necessary, since there is no 
logical blunder in supposing that this factually necessary being does not 
exist. 
Is it part of God's essence that He is factually necessary? It seems clear that it 
is part of the theistic definition of 'God'  that He exists at all points in time. This 
does not guarantee that God is non-dependent upon any other entity, since it is 
consistent to describe entities which exist at all points in time, but which depend 
for this permanence upon some other being. For example, Hercules was a mortal 
who was granted immortality by a greater being, the god Zeus. A being might 
exist at all points in time under the eye of some superior being with the forever 
unexercised power to extinguish this lesser being. But a defining characteristic of 
God is omnipotence, which precludes the possibility of such a superior being 
with the power to maintain or terminate His existence. Any being that depends 
upon another for its existence is limited by it, and no omnipotent being can be 
thus limited. 
So if ~necessary' means 'factually necessary' in P2 then it is true, indeed 
necessarily true. But if P1 is to be supported by Hume's Principle then it must 
talk of logical necessity, in which case the Disproof is invalid. This ambiguity 
could be avoided by insisting that P1 is the claim that no thing has factually 
necessary existence, but then it would either be false, if there are things such as 
the sub-atomic particles already discussed, or there would be no a priori basis for 
accepting it. Alternatively, if both premises talk of logical necessity then P2 is 
unsupported. Assuming that God exists, then He exists as a factually necessary 
being. But it does not follow from his factual necessity that God does not exist is 
a self-contradiction. 
Finally, does Hume's Principle really support the Disproof?. 
First, even if Hume's Principle is true, its use is question-begging. A defender 
of Anselm could consistently insist that God exists is one particular positive 
existential claim which is logically necessary and is therefore a counterexample 
to Hume's Principle. Second, There exists a prime number between 4 and 6 
seems to falsify the Principle, since it is apparently an existential claim and 
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moreover cannot be consistently denied, since it is a matter of  definition that 5 is 
between 4 and 6, and that 5 is prime. 
The Principle could be defended by observing that i f  numbers and 
propositions exist, they do not exist in the same way as such non-mysterious 
entities as tables. So it can be modified to assert that no positive claim about the 
existence of observable entities type-identical with tables rather than with 
numbers or propositions, is necessarily true. Now the Principle is immune from 
the example, since the existence of the number 5 is not a matter of  observation. 
But now that this modification has been made, does it still support Findlay's 
Disproof?. Now it reads: 
P ' )  No observable thing exists necessarily. 
P2) If  God exists then He exists necessarily. 
C) Necessarily, God dos not exist. 
But now the Disproof is invalid, unless 'God'  is the name of  an observable entity, 
which seems difficult to reconcile with His essential incorporeality. For'the same 
reason, the Principle will not even work against the modal proof of God's 
existence. 
VI. Conclusion 
Findlay's Disproof is coherent and consistent, but unsound or ungrounded. 
Either it is invalid or its premisses contain falsehoods or claims which cannot be 
supported. 
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